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Diffusion of the utopias. The academy and the media in times of pandemic. At the end of the 
20th century, the disappearance of the great utopias occurs. Crises are favorable moments to 
imagine better worlds.  Social scientists and humanists - because of their knowledge of reality and 
its possibilities for change - are privileged to visualize the Covid-19 crisis as an opportunity for 
change and transfer the orientation of change to all of society.  This is a transcendental 
translation for the consolidation of utopia in the social imaginary.  This work explores the 
rehabilitation of utopia in the exceptional circumstances of the pandemic's start by academics.  
Doing this identifies, classifies, and analyzes the specific proposals that these thinkers have 
published in the press to move towards a happy world.  We note that the pandemic has not 
managed to rehabilitate the utopia and that the community's proposals for change are fragmented. 
We consider that this fragmentation is a symptom of micro-stories, which implies a shift towards 
micro-routes. However, medium-range utopias proliferate in which messages appear insistently 
and, in that sense, may be reflected in the social imaginary.   
 






A voyage, a navigator... believes he has seen an ideal state on an island, in a 
place beyond the equator. Utopia as a term is an idealization of Thomas More that 
we use here as an excuse (not of social justice) but of social idealization. Of 
idealization in the social imaginary. The accounts of academics in the social 
sciences and humanities (academics as we call them here as they include a wide 
range of experts or thinkers) can convey the possibility of making idealizations 
real.   
In reality, imagining a profoundly different and better world is a 
phenomenon present throughout human history because the pursuit of happiness, 
individual and collective, is inherent to the human condition. However, since the 
mid-twentieth century there has been a paralysis of "imagination of the future, an 
exhaustion of the avant-garde, a weakening of the great discourses of 
emancipation" (Di Ruzza, 2011, p. 117). The cause of this weakening is found in 





the significant change in the social imaginary that marks the beginning of 
postmodernity: sensitivity to diversity privileged pluralism, and metanarratives 
were replaced by micro-narratives. Utopias, as a result of the imaginary of their 
time, have undergone the same evolution. Thus, the metanarrative of the human 
being's emancipation as a universal has lost credibility and fragmented into micro-
narratives of particular groups' emancipations. The type of transformations 
possible, the depth of change, the agents promoting ideas, and the emancipatory 
action leaders are now multiple and modest. This is a characteristic phenomenon 
of our times. The question is whether the range of micro-utopias replacing the 
great utopias can lead to real social transformation. For the moment, micro-
utopias have not generated transformative synergies. For this reason, some argue 
for the need to restore broken social unity and traditional utopianism. 
Although not all social crises are accompanied by daydreams and attempts 
to materialize these daydreams, utopian thinking comes to fruition in times of 
social crisis. It is plausible to ask whether this Covid-19 crisis - bringing death, 
disease, unemployment, poverty, and restriction of freedoms - has fostered the 
imagination of a different world, helping to overcome the decline of utopian 
thinking at the end of the 20th century.  
Among the now modest promoters of social transformation ideas, academics 
in the social sciences and humanities stand out. Social scientists and humanists 
have specialized knowledge about reality, about how it is constructed and can be 
modified by collectivities. This places them in a privileged position to visualize 
the crisis of Covid-19 as an opportunity for change; secondly, to put into practice 
proposals for emancipatory social transformation; and thirdly, to transfer them to 
society as a whole. This translation is fundamental for the creation of a new 
culture, a new utopian imaginary in society. 
 
Object and method 
In a previous study (Ribón and Pérez-González, 2020), we analyzed social 
scientists and humanists' discourses on the crisis of Covid-19 as an opportunity for 
social change disseminated in the Spanish-language press. Then, we had the 
opportunity to see how the few scientists who spoke of the crisis as an opportunity 




did so from the hope that the world has progressed and will progress as long as 
there is a desire to do so. This article explores the expression of those desires. As 
well as identifying proposals for change, and assessing the thematic variety, this 
paper considers their holistic or partial character. In this sense, it looks at whether 
there is a rehabilitation of traditional utopianism and whether there are 
connections between micro-utopias that invite us to think about the creation of 
synergies. Furthermore, it aims to highlight whether there is the construction of a 
narrative capable of being reflected in the imaginary. We try to observe how 
scientists' discourse is reconstructed as a whole, or how different narratives are 
formed and whether or not they have unity. The analysis of the transformative 
ideas of academic and intellectual personalities is carried out using sociological 
discourse analysis. Sociological discourse analysis is the study of the spoken 
narrative of a subject or social group in which the text itself is examined and, in 
addition, the narrative as a process of a context that can only be interpreted within 
it. It is the study of messages delivered in a given cognitive, social, political, 
historical, and cultural situation. 
Within the vast range of instruments provided by discourse analysis, a 
selection of tools inspired by Barthes' work (1987, 1990, 2000) has been made. 
These are: the identification of themes and sub-themes; the search for meaning; 
the establishment of the basic structure of the storyline; and the revelation of 
myths or ideological representations of the social in an apparently natural way. On 
the other hand, the use of these tools does not imply the assumption of all the 
author's structuralist thinking. 
Discourse analysis requires, first of all, the compilation of a corpus of 
documents. This research selects two types of narratives: the one published in the 
national written press and the one reflected in social networks. The documentary 
corpus of the national written press includes general information newspapers in a 
digital format with wide circulation and more specialized and minority 
publications. The search was limited to texts published between 1 March and 15 
July 2020 in Spanish whose protagonists were academics who belong or have 
belonged to university institutions or research centers dedicated to Anthropology, 
Law, Economics, Education, Philosophy, Geography, History, Sociology, or 





Political Science. The current work shows a difference between each academic's 
individual production and its reflection or dissemination in the media. Sixty-four 
authors have been identified, of whom fifty have a mother tongue other than 
Spanish. This shows the interest of media in gathering opinions from abroad and 
confirms that most of the authors are academic media personalities and/or 
recognized international prestige.  
 
The Fragmentation of Utopia in Postmodernity 
The concept of utopia has varied throughout history. This paper assumes the 
views of Mannheim and Bloch. For Mannheim (1987, pp. 178, 229-230), utopia is 
the search for a society incongruent with the present state of affairs in dialectical 
relation to the ideology that maintains the existing social order. For Bloch (1980), 
utopia is a radical manifestation of man's dissatisfaction with the reality around 
him, a proposal for a better future and an expression of hope as an innate human 
principle. With Bloch, utopia is inextricably linked to human welfare and 
emancipation, as well as distanced from any authoritarian, discriminatory, or 
exploitative project. 
Utopia can fulfill two functions: a function of social criticism, by expressing 
dissatisfaction, and a function of compensation, by proposing an improvement. 
Not all utopias fulfill the compensatory function and lead to progress, but progress 
requires utopias. As Wright (2010) states, "while it may be naïve optimism to say 
that "when you want it, you can", it is true that without a "want" many "powers" 
will be impossible" (p. 22). Therefore, it is necessary to dream beyond what we 
believe to be achievable and move some issues from the category of unthinkable 
to thinkable (Wood, 2007). The exploration of real alternatives is a transformative 
process in itself (Levitas et al., 2003, p. 14), while the absence of utopias leads to 
political myopia (Sousa, 2020, p. 580), social immobilism, and the reification of 
the human being (Mannheim, 1987, pp. 229-230).  
Utopia is a manifestation of the social imaginary. It contains what is - 
values, customs, beliefs of the moment - and what can be - what is desired and 
what can be achieved in the future (Maffesoli, 2003; Figueroa & López Levi, 
2014). The imaginary is an interpretative matrix through which society organizes 




its past, present and future in a consistent and intertwined manner. In this way, 
only the idea of a present as something transformable by man's will drives 
collective approaches and efforts to implement changes that transfigure the future. 
In this sense, we interpret Maffesoli's (2003) assertion that the imaginary gives 
utopia its strength.  
The social imaginary underwent a historical turn that gave rise to modernity 
when it conceived of man as capable of achieving a state of plenitude without 
divine intervention. Utopia then ceased to be an exercise of the imagination, 
became something with a real impact on everyday life and was erected in the 19th 
century in programmes of revolutionary action. The relative failure of these 
programmes and the world wars led to disillusionment. The utopian ceased to 
occupy a central place in the imaginary (Figueroa & López Levi, 2014). The 
number of publications on the subject declined. The fall of the myth of progress 
and the great ideals of social transformation, the paralysis of the future's 
imagination (Di Ruzza, 2011) and the end of utopia was diagnosed. Nevertheless, 
utopia is not dead. It survives and endures. What happens is that today's utopia is 
not the same as yesterday's (Martorell, 2015, p. 300) because utopias express the 
imaginary of their time and the social imaginary experienced another historical 
turn in the second half of the twentieth century that has given rise to 
postmodernity.  
Following Lyotard (1987), a central feature of postmodernity is the end of 
metanarratives - grand narratives or theories about what the world is like - and 
their replacement by micro-narratives - small narratives of a part of reality. 
Postmodernity is characterized by micro-narratives because we have become 
sensitive and privilege diversity (Lyotard, 1987; Lipovetsky, 1983, p. 19). 
Pluralism is imposed and with it, values, beliefs, desires and possible solutions are 
relativised. There are no common texts. Nobody agrees any more on what is real, 
desirable, and achievable. This is the end of universalism. Everyone has their own 
perspective of what is true, desirable, and achievable. It is the age of non-
universalisable particularities.  
The dissolution of metanarratives and the (accompanying) pluralism include 
disbelief towards metanarratives of human emancipation and the questioning of 





those utopian forms that imply truth and morality claims (Levitas et al., 2003, p. 
15). Modernity's yearning for the perfection of society fragments into 
heterogeneous utopian desires during postmodernity. There have always been 
different projects of happier worlds, but the projects had a universalizing character 
until the first part of the 20th century. Now, they do not.  
The decomposition of narratives is the decomposition of society. Meta-
narratives contained a unifying power that was projected onto society. The 
fragmentation of narratives causes the dissolution of the traditional union of the 
parts of the social body and its substitution by minuscule links that form the fabric 
of complex relations (Lyotard, 1987, p. 15). With this, the organicist metaphor of 
society gives way to the network society's metaphor (Baudrillard, 1984, p. 188; 
Bauman, 2004, p. 57; Castells, 2003, p. 175). Macro-communities are broken 
down into social micro-communities, groups, or tribes, as Lipovetsky would say, 
which are articulated according to a growing supply of feelings, experiences, 
emotions, subcultures, and lifestyles. The personalization of the supply of 
experiences allows individuals to join different groups flexibly and fluidly. 
Different groups identify their own injustices, hold their own goals and imagine 
their own utopias. Desires to emancipate humanity have become desires to 
emancipate groups, and utopian societies have given way to utopian groups 
(Misseri, 2011, p. 76). 
 
Interpretations and ways of dealing with micro-utopianism 
Utopian fragmentation has different interpretations. On the one hand, 
microutopias are seen as the appropriate utopian form in this model of society. On 
the other hand, they are seen as a counter-utopia because they prevent the 
development of major transformations. Finally, they are recognized as an 
acceptable but insufficient utopian form.  
The good-natured interpretation of fragmentation assumes that meta-
narratives are anachronistic and unjust in a plural society. They are anachronistic 
in that they proclaim a totalitarian and unitarist perspective on society. They are 
unjust in that a single theory or worldview (in a diverse world) would be the 
imposition of one party's view on others. The postponement of metanarratives in 




postmodernity includes those that proclaim universal emancipation. Hence, 
Lyotard's proposal is to abandon utopias as narratives that have historically 
legitimized systems and have acted as obstacles that limit the unlimited 
deployment of the system (Jiménez, 2007, p. 102). If utopia is fragmented and 
sustained by a plurality of utopian groups, consequently and for the sake of 
coherence, emancipatory action must be equally fragmented and located in them. 
Society today is not a totality and therefore cannot be changed as a whole from a 
single center of emancipation. On the contrary, emancipatory actions have to be 
carried out in subsystems in a diffuse way (Heller, 1988, p. 183). From this kind 
of interpretation, one can only welcome this micro-utopian scenario and hope that 
conjunction of emancipatory actions will bring about an accumulation of social 
changes that alter the status quo. If enough people connect their micro-utopias, it 
will be possible to achieve a global synergy of change, Fuller announced in 1975. 
The paradox is that the abandonment of utopia that Lyotard supports is itself a 
utopia. At least, if one believes in the goodness of micro-utopianism.   
The negative interpretation of utopian fragmentation gives a positive sense 
to the totalizing character of utopia. This is only possible from the concept of 
utopia as an emancipating element of humanity. Utopia is linked to humanism that 
privileges every individual's well-being over the glory of the group, the tribe, even 
the nation. It is individuals and not groups who feel happiness. Everyone's well-
being is the true progress because if the well-being of all is not achieved, the 
malaise will remain. Utopia is totalizing because it pursues the perfection and 
well-being of the whole human race. It is also totalizing because to achieve the 
human race's perfection, as Levitas (2010, p. 15) states, it is necessary to look at 
the social, economic, political, and spatial process holistically. Moreover, she 
adds, there is no sign that the micro-changes achieved by micro-utopias translate 
into macro-changes that challenge the status quo (ibid. p. 23). Misseri (2011, p. 
76) argues that microutopianism is the negation of utopianism wrapped in utopian 
rhetoric. Its short-term goals and its limited emancipation subjects are tied to 
ideology and the maintenance of the existing social order. The fragmentation of 
utopia would make any general proposal against it impossible. From the negative 
perspective of micro-utopianism, this must be overcome. To do so, the fractured 





unity of social or human interests must be restored, social fragmentation must be 
resolved, the sense of the global must be restored and traditional utopianism must 
be defended (Kumar, 1995; Misseri, 2011, p. 84). 
The third interpretation of utopian fragmentation admits both the need for 
utopian diversification and the need for a totalizing (but not totalitarian) utopia. 
Utopian diversification and utopia are necessary if we want a pluralistic society, 
which is different from a simple pluralistic society and a totalitarian society. In a 
plural society there is a diversity of ethics and proposals that do not have to be 
shared. In a totalitarian society, a single ethic and a single proposal for society are 
imposed. In a pluralist society, people coexist who, on the one hand, share an 
ethic of "minimums" capable of giving rise to utopias and, on the other hand, 
propose different ethics of "maximums" that give rise to micro-utopias. In a 
pluralist society there is a certain social cohesion and utopia guides progress 
within the framework of respect for legitimate difference, which respects human 
dignity and life (Misseri, 2011, p. 88). In a pluralistic society, there are essential 
margins of freedom and micro-utopias (paraphrasing Cortina, 1996, p. 38), which 
are not imposed on others, but, at most, are invited to be shared through dialogue 
and personal testimony. The latter is what utopian communities do when they 
initiate utopian projects in the here and now that, although they have not 
demonstrated the capacity to make a considerable change, evidence their 
possibility.   
 
Social scientists and humanists as agents of utopias in times of crisis 
All three interpretations of utopian fragmentation share the idea of a present 
transformable by human will. However, as already mentioned, once the social 
imaginary admits the transformative power of human beings, it has to determine 
what kinds of happy worlds are possible, how they can be achieved, at what pace, 
who is in a position to imagine them, and who is in a position to lead their 
execution. Levitas et. al. (2003, p. 16) complains about the difficulty of 
identifying mechanisms and agents of real transformation of the global economic 
and social system. The problem is that if there is no convincing narrative in the 
imaginary about who are the actors capable of envisioning better worlds, who are 




capable of executing change, or what transformative processes are possible, then 
utopias are just illusions that do not translate into political action (Levitas et. al., 
2003, p. 14). They fulfill the critical function, but not the compensatory function 
that materializes progress.   
Social scientists and humanists are in a privileged to be identified as suitable 
agents for envisioning better worlds because their knowledge aims to inquire into 
and interpret elements of the past, present, and future. However, this alone does 
not lead to utopian praxis. Firstly, because two ways of interpreting academic 
practice coexist in the academic imaginary: one is favourable to social change and 
the imagination of new and better worlds, and the other is unfavourable to these 
issues. Secondly, because the academy is caught between, on the one hand, the 
need to legitimise itself socially and contribute to the solution of social problems 
and, on the other hand, a process of adopting a business logic that diverts it from 
the former. Thirdly, because the media focus their attention on the diagnosis and 
prognosis of the crisis and leave little space for transformative possibilities, even 
if these possibilities are real and concrete utopias and not utopianisms. This media 
outreach work is essential if utopias are to be consolidated in the new imaginary. 
The first way of understanding knowledge and academic practice only looks 
to the future to make a prognosis based on past and present data. It discredits the 
work of scientists who question the now and dream of changing tomorrow. Thus, 
it eschews utopia. It is a vision derived from positivism that conceives science as 
an aid to the achievement of happiness (through social transformation, but 
neutrally evaluative), within a discourse alien to the context and above the society 
that provides it (Rodríguez, 2002, p. 45). This is an aseptic perception of science, 
in which science is placed above ethics (Jiménez, 2007, p. 80).   
The second way of understanding knowledge and academic practice makes 
it possible to imagine a better and realisable future based on data from the past 
and the present. It impels scientists to commit themselves to progress. It thus 
invites utopia. This position identifies scientific knowledge as a cultural and not a 
neutral product (Woolgar, 1991). It understands that, when science does not fulfil 
the critical function of utopia, it is, contrary to popular belief, not neutral, but is 
directly or indirectly supporting the established social order by allowing those in 





power to direct change in order to maintain their status. Scientists who yield to the 
allegedly aseptic vision would be, from this second position, manufacturers of 
consensus, controllers of social change and accomplices of counter-utopia 
(Martín, 2006). According to Sousa (1995), the university experienced a crisis of 
legitimacy as its lack of collective objectives became visible.  
In order not to be complicit in the counter-utopia and to re-legitimise the 
university, as Sousa (2007) would say, scientists have to strive to be objective, but 
not neutral. Firstly, science has to investigate the functioning of social structures 
and institutions, unveiling the mechanisms of power, domination, violence, 
inequality and injustice that make a happy life impossible; mechanisms that have 
never been obvious, but that today more than ever resist knowledge because they 
take increasingly complex and diffuse forms. Secondly, social scientists and 
humanists have to articulate counter-hegemonic proposals. To become, as Giroux 
(1990, p. 178) says, transformative intellectuals who articulate both a critical 
discourse that denounces injustices and a discourse of the possibility of the 
changes that can be produced. A proposal that, on the other hand, Gramsci had 
already made in his time when speaking of intellectuals. 
All human beings have the capacity to imagine better worlds because the 
search for happiness, both individual and collective, is inherent to the human 
condition. However, social scientists and humanists have an advantage over the 
rest when it comes to proposing utopias: their knowledge of the past and the 
present allows them to imagine viable proposals.  Utopian proposals move on a 
continuum between, on the one hand, the fanciful, abstract and unrealistic and, on 
the other, the concrete and possible. Fanciful utopias or utopianism are a literary 
manifestation of a journey without a destination or, worse, a journey into an 
"unforeseen abyss" (Wright, 2010, p. 22). Because they are unrealisable or, worse, 
do not lead where they are meant to lead, they have come to be labelled as a 
delusion. This view of utopia is not only pejorative, but has functioned throughout 
history as a figure of speech that designates the whole by the parts: one part of 
utopia (the unrealisable) has been taken as the whole (that which is yet to be 
realised and may or may not materialise). In contrast to this utopia, as fanciful as a 
lie and with certain doses of irrationality, there is a realisable utopia guided by 




reason and, for this very reason, approachable by science. Engels (1882) wrote 
From Utopian Socialism to Scientific Socialism, excluding utopia and confronting 
it with reason and science (although his own proposal was also a utopia). Today, 
the aim is to move from this counter-utopian scientism that has excluded utopia to 
utopian scientism that makes compatible and embraces the projection of better 
worlds. For Bloch, utopian reason emerges even beyond scientific reason because 
it allows the discovery of profound aspects of existence, not only on the 
theoretical plane, but also on the plane of reality. The academy distinguishes itself 
by striving to justify and detail realisable and true utopias. Bloch (1977-1980) 
advocates the "concrete utopia", which is one that specifies the elements of 
change and thus anticipates and enables the improvement of the world. Wright 
(2010) preaches the "real utopia" which is the ideal of the realistic potential of 
humanity "with accessible intermediate stops" that allow walking through "a 
world of imperfect conditions of social change" (p. 22). Real utopia is an effective 
proposal for pragmatic improvement of institutions and, in that sense, an 
accommodation to the context. It is not fixed, as realism is shaped by the way we 
see the world.  
Realisable, "concrete" and "real" utopias can be expressed at any time, but 
crises are ideal moments for this. Still, not all social crises are accompanied by 
daydreams and attempts to realise these daydreams. A crisis is a favourable 
juncture for social change, but change can be projected for different purposes. It 
can be oriented towards the immediate past, which is what is considered habitual 
or natural. Those inducing this change have as their ultimate aspiration to achieve 
a world as close as possible to the one that existed before the conflict: a return to 
normality. It may be aimed at making small adjustments in order to avoid another 
similar crisis. It may even advance mutations that had already begun prior to the 
crisis. Finally, it can be oriented towards the creation, recovery or re-elaboration 
of utopias of social order. Some remain an expression of discontent and 
dissatisfaction with the current situation, or a mere evasion of the problems, while 
others are searches for emancipatory alternatives.  
Let us look again at the exceptional circumstance of the Covid-19 crisis as a 
laboratory test. The pandemic is an opportune moment for social scientists and 





humanists to express emancipatory utopias, concrete and real; new, recovered or 
reworked; systematized or fragmented; isolated or articulated to create synergies; 
disseminating a positive image of the future and the hope of a happy world 
attainable in society. Expression without diffusion has no social resonance. As 
Gramsci (1986) warned, change requires a new culture. It is not enough to make 
original discoveries individually, but it is also necessary to critically disseminate 
truths already discovered, to bring "those truths" to "a mass of men" so that they 
are not only the "patrimony of small intellectual groups" (p. 247). Dissemination, 
mainly through mass media, helps to consolidate the new utopias in the 
imaginary. Of course, social scientists and humanists' statements that the media 
disseminate are not equivalent to what they think or what they publish in 
academic circles. There is a filter of characters and messages that are of interest. 
In the media, there is a battle between turning the catastrophe event into a 
catharsis for further emancipation or a pretext for further domination. Beck (2015) 
calls an emancipatory catastrophe a catastrophe that not only has negative 
consequences, but also has positive consequences for progress. Klein (2007) calls 
shock doctrine a doctrine that promotes the exploitation of a catastrophe that 
paralyses society in order to promote policies that benefit the elites and harm the 
rest. The dissemination of positive and possible images of the future is 
fundamental in this dilemma. 
 
Utopian proposals from social scientists and humanists during Covid-19 
Statements by social and humanist scholars in the press abound in 
interpretations of the pandemic (diagnosis) and interpretations of what will come 
after it (prognosis). However, interpretations of moral, social, political or 
economic changes necessary for the progress of a post-Covid world are scarce. 
Wishes appear in the middle of other issues or at the end of the interviews and 
take up little space compared to diagnoses and prognoses. They take up little 
space, and yet they are the result of major reflections which, however developed 
they may be in their publications, are formulated here in a terse manner, which 
means that very concrete proposals remain decontextualised and general ideas are 
left unrealised. They can be found in any type of media: with greater or lesser 




circulation, generalist or more specialised. Decontextualisation, generalisation and 
the type of media in which they are disseminated are of interest for the 
construction of imaginaries. 
Of all the press studied, two initiatives stand out that have invited us to 
explore the future: one in El País, and the other in Público. In the period studied, 
El País is the newspaper with the largest national circulation, and Público is the 
seventh largest online newspaper in terms of readership. El País published on 4 
May 2020, under the title El futuro después del Coronavirus, a compilation of 
seventy-five interviews with experts and thinkers, many of them academics in the 
social sciences and humanities. They asked specifically what the world will be 
like at the end of this crisis and what direction we should take. It is this "we must" 
that is of interest here. Público offered twenty-five experts from the country, with 
a very varied profile and a smaller presence of academics, a space to debate the 
future of Spain and the European Union, giving priority to the analysis of 
proposals with a great impact on the lives of citizens, but including those that lead 
to a change of paradigm. The rest of the media collect images of better worlds 
without systematising them. Although there is no systematisation in the collection 
of transformative projects, there are media, such as La Vanguardia or Ethic, in 
which these abound. Below, we describe the proposals for a better world 
expressed by academics. Since part of the value of the thoughts lies in the way 
they are expressed, we reproduce some of the statements verbatim. Thus, the 
quotations in this section correspond to the sources consulted.  
In the media, academics express, above all, desires to transform part of 
reality. We have identified six axes around which these desires for transformation 
revolve: the economy and finance; the environment; democracy; global 
governance; the state and its policies, mainly those concerning health and work; 
and the human being itself. In addition, two topics are cross-cutting: social justice 
and solidarity. Only a minority spoke of the need for a generalised transformation 
of the world and of the proposal of utopias. Francisco Martorell calls for the 
recovery of utopia (but he is an expert on the subject). Jeremy Rifkin proposes 
changing everything: the way we organise our economy, society, governments, 
our way of being on this planet. Aurélien Barrau believes it is necessary to invent 





something new, to desire the possible, to act in a revolutionary way and to obtain 
a new reality. Stephan Lessenich speaks of reconfiguring the system. Camille 
Peugny wants to design, together, a change of system and advocates the 
coordinated reaction of left-wing movements and parties. Timothy Garton Ash 
also believes that the post-Covid world needs globalised collective action. 
The economic-financial sphere is the one with the largest number of 
suggestions. There are few strong statements in favour of a total change of the 
economic system. The magnitude of such change places these proposals in the 
category of grand utopias. Among the academics identified, outside of capitalism, 
Slavoj Zizek, Francisco Vázquez and Stephen Lessenich stand out. Lessenich 
believes that we should get rid of capitalism because it is a system based on the 
production of inequalities. The problem is that this is very complicated, even 
utopian. Firstly, because we have internalised capitalist logic. Secondly, because 
the system produces citizens who, even if they criticise capitalism, have an 
intrinsic interest in its perpetuation. Michael J. Sandel invites us to reflect on 
"whether to reopen the economy" and "go back to a system that has divided us for 
40 years or to give ourselves a new economic system that allows us to say with 
conviction that we are all in this together". So, while it guides the answer, it does 
not impose it or develop it. Twenty academics call for either explicitly 
transformations within capitalism or other economies without specifying (whether 
this entails a displacement of capitalism or just a new kind of capitalism). This 
disjuncture can be resolved by studying their thoughts or by searching for earlier 
statements, but the interest is in what they say and what the media report during 
the pandemic as an opportunity for reflection and change.  
Most academics agree on the desirability of moving away from 
neoliberalism by developing more social and greener economies. Wierviorka 
wants a less liberal globalisation, but does not renounce liberalism. Gilles 
Lipovetsky explicitly advocates a new capitalism and argues that this is the best of 
the current means. This does not mean that any capitalism is good, but rather that 
its value lies in allowing its own correction. The main correction is that the 
economy is a means and not an end. The ideal, for him, is a liberal economy with 
one very important condition: that it is subject to higher interests. These interests 




include respect for the environment and the avoidance of inequalities that are 
difficult to overcome. Lipovetsky, in an explicit defence of capitalism and 
liberalism that others do not make, summarises the problem: economic logic has 
been imposed and its subjugation is urgent in two areas: the social and the 
environmental.  
This approach is nothing new. It is the basis of sustainable development, 
which is not mentioned. However, several authors allude to it and call for 
something close to it: a Green New Deal. This is what Ann Pettifor, author of The 
Case for the Green New Deal, Jeremy Rifkin, author of The Global Green New 
Deal, and Noam Chomsky, co-author of Change or Die: Capitalism, Climate 
Crisis and the Green New Deal. Environmental degradation is the starting point of 
this proposal whose resolution requires new finance, new productive systems, new 
activities and new jobs. A mandate, as Rifkin says, for a different and responsible 
relationship with the planet. An economy that approaches sustainable 
development, but which places greater emphasis on the ecological than on the 
social. Some authors focus their attention on the environment (green predominates 
over any other colour). Others, like Chomsky, add overcoming terrible social 
inequalities to the formula. And some, like Jayati Ghosh, believe that "we need to 
think about a new multi-coloured deal", suggesting that the economy should be 
"greener, but also purple to emphasise the care economy and the gender 
economy". We know that Ghosh proposes this new multi-coloured deal as an 
extension of the Green New Deal of which she is a supporter, but in the Spanish-
language press consulted, her proposal is not part of it. Its appearance, therefore, 
is diluted, especially when we have found no other references to a new deal or 
multicoloured economy. This absence is particularly interesting in the case of 
Spain, where the 15M movement was accompanied by the so-called mareas: the 
white tide in favour of public health, the green tide in favour of public education, 
the yellow tide for accessible justice, the orange tide against cuts in care for 
people with disabilities, and where there is also a vibrant LGTBI movement. 
However, there are no statements in the press by academics mentioning this multi-
coloured economy.  





The name Green New Deal is descriptive because of its parallels with 
Roosevelt's New Deal and seeks to resonate with the US citizenry, mainly among 
the Democratic electorate sympathetic to Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio, 
but with a vocation to spread to the rest of the world. It does so, moreover, with 
the urgency inherent in movement campaigns: "if we don't get a Green New Deal, 
a disgrace will happen", says Chomsky. In the interviews conducted in the days of 
the pandemic, he is barely described, so his contribution to the imaginary is little 
more than evidence of a movement in the Anglo-Saxon sphere.  
The Green New Deal movement, despite being presented as a complete 
reorganisation of the US economy, contrasts with another more holistic 
reorganisation proposal made by Francisco Vázquez from Europe: participatory 
ecosocialism. Here, the defence of the social is made openly from the standpoint 
of socialism; the social and the ecological are of equal importance and are so 
closely linked that they are a single word and, in order to avoid confusion with 
respect to other socialisms, it is also linked to participatory democracy. The way 
to go green is to "make extensive use of social ownership mechanisms already 
existing in some countries, such as co-management, equal participation of workers 
on company boards, cooperativism, temporary ownership or means such as rent 
limitation and basic income". If the New Deal is sung in chorus, participatory 
ecosocialism is a solo. It does not have the capacity to permeate the imaginary. 
Zizek's voice is also sung in a solo, but with greater international projection. Zizek 
takes advantage of the crisis of the coronavirus to metaphorically disqualify 
capitalism as a virus. He advocates a new communism as a synonym for a unified 
humanity, based on trust in international cooperation, people and science, where 
the state is the protagonist. Both participatory ecosocialism and new communism 
are a revision of grand utopian projects. This, as we see, does not make them more 
popular. The opposite is true of the New Green Deal, which could be defined as a 
utopia of medium scope. Although it covers three areas: economic, social and 
environmental, the depth of the changes, however, raises doubts as a traditional 
grand utopia.  
Environmental advocacy is popular among social scientists and humanists 
and therefore generates resonance is environmental advocacy. This is expressed in 




different ways. Victor Gómez Pin wishes for a "society at peace with its 
environment powered by clean energy" and stresses the importance of having 
energy to continue to evolve. Yuval Noah Harari hopes "that we learn the lesson 
about climate change: that it is better to invest money now to avoid the worst 
scenario, than to wait until the crisis hits and it is too late". Bruno Latour, Franco 
Berardi and Emmanuele Felice agree in interpreting the pandemic as an event that 
helps to question the primacy of the economic over the social and the 
environment. Felice believes that "the pandemic shows that we can put the 
economic system at the service of human rights, of the environment, instead of the 
other way around". Berardi calls for a new awareness of human fragility "that 
allows for a friendlier relationship with nature and our fellow human beings", 
understanding that equality (which had been destroyed in the political 
imagination), is now presented as a closer possibility. Bruno Latour believes that 
the "pandemic has shown us that the economy is a very narrow and limited way of 
organising life and deciding who is important and who is not". He recalls that "the 
idea of framing everything in terms of the economy is something new in human 
history". He asserts that, "if I could change one thing, it would be to get out of the 
production system and instead build a political ecology" and that "what we need is 
not just to change the production system, but to get out of it altogether", not by 
going back to the "old climate regime".  
There are other defences of the environment which, although brief, are of 
interest because reiteration is effective in the construction of imaginaries. Manuel 
Castells denounces the mistreatment of the planet. Boaventura De Sousa raises the 
need to change the energy and consumption strategy. Vázquez calls for an 
ecological fiscal policy. Richard Sennett sees in the Covid crisis an event that 
proves him right in his commitment to a "fifteen-minute city" in which prosperity 
and ecology are integrated. So much insistence and variety of approaches to the 
same subject invites us to think about the creation of a synergy which, moreover, 
does not remain in the space of nature, since the acceptance of ecological 
approaches implies the modification of production, work, consumption and life 
systems in general. Thus, although Kumar in 1995 (pp. 27-28) describes the 
defence of the environment as a fragmentary utopian project (because it is used by 





specific groups with specific objectives), today it can be identified as an important 
utopia. 
The pandemic is interpreted as an event that highlights the need for the 
provision of public goods. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Dani Rodrick and Stephen 
Lessenich agree that societies need public goods: starting with health services and 
escaping subjugation to the laws of the market (Delmas-Marty); to be provided by 
governments when markets fail to do so (Rodrick); and to be relied upon and 
called upon in times of crisis (Lessenich). Based on the need for public goods and 
the prominence of the social, Lessenich introduces the concept of the "economy of 
the necessary" and invites us to reflect on what we really need and what is 
superfluous, and Franco Berardi calls for rescuing the value of what is useful.  
The public provision of goods requires large resources. For this reason and 
for the sake of social justice, fiscal and tax reform is a common theme. Ghosh 
calls for a fair system of taxation. Stiglitz, a fairer and more flexible tax system. 
Piketty calls for a tax reform for a fairer and more progressive tax system and 
develops his argument: the freedom of capital established by the rich countries has 
encouraged the flight of millionaires and multinationals, and this has damaged the 
construction of a social state. The construction of a social state, capable of 
providing public goods to its citizens, requires bringing the largest and richest 
companies into the system. This is Castells' argument: the financing of welfare 
should not mean more taxes for people. It must go to where the wealth is 
concentrated, which are "the global financial markets and the big multinationals 
that are legal tax evaders". Banning tax havens and taxing financial movements 
are part of this plan. 
Public provision of goods refers to a reconsideration of state intervention in 
the economy. The pandemic highlights the need for the state. This fact makes the 
following statements very likely to be perceived as true. This is what, in the 
language of collective action, is called "empirical credibility". Empirical 
credibility occurs when there is a congruence between people's experience and 
events (Snow et al., 1986) and helps to create an imaginary. Domenico de Masi 
stresses the need for the state and takes the opportunity to criticise 
decentralisation. Sousa explains it in the pedagogical way that the construction of 




an imaginary requires: "For the last 40 years we have been told that the state is 
inefficient and corrupt, and that markets are good, that the market is the best 
regulator of social life. But a pandemic comes and nobody asks about markets. 
Nobody asks the market to save them, to protect them, they ask the state. And the 
state has to assume its responsibilities, whether it is implementing policies or 
guaranteeing rights. Michael J. Sandel hopes for a policy of the common good 
that restores social bonds. Vicens Navarro and Caroline Emcke, an orientation 
towards the common good to improve people's lives. Yusuf Adigüzel, a welfare 
state. Piketty, investing in the social. Sousa, investing in education, health, 
transport and infrastructure. Latour, a public health system. Lipovetsky, a 
supranational European health system. Judith Butler, a governmental power that 
guarantees the right to health and equality. Della Porta, reaffirming and extending 
health and labour rights and achieving the global right to health. The pandemic 
puts access to health in the foreground and employment issues in the background. 
The desires that are expressed about employment are strongly influenced by the 
current situation: to recognise, dignify and revalue useful and essential 
employment (Peugny, Sandel). Only an expert in utopias such as Martorell 
remembers to dream of reducing working time. The work that exists must be 
dignified, but, in contrast to the utopia of shared and satisfactory work for all, the 
utopia of the right to a dignified life as something universal, independent of work, 
is strongly introduced (Berardi). This right is materialised in the universal basic 
income (Bergman, Vázquez, Martorell).  
The desire for a new role of the state goes beyond a greater social 
orientation. There is also a dream of a state capable of maintaining a different type 
of relationship with its citizens and of tackling the problems of the planet together. 
On the one hand, there is a desire for a state that develops a closer and more 
cordial relationship with society (Adigüzel and Rifkin); more open, transparent 
and democratic (Valcárcel); capable of offering the services of the welfare state in 
a depoliticised and de-bureaucratised way (Castells); and with a friendlier way of 
doing politics (Felice).  
On the other hand, there are dreams of better global governance (Rodrick, 
Badie). There is only one world and things that happen in some countries have 





very drastic effects all over the planet (Singer). The survival of humanity depends 
on the resolution of global problems (such as the environmental crisis or poverty), 
which are not on the agenda of national governments (Luigi Ferrajoli, Massimo 
Cacciari). We must therefore have more global concerns and address them with 
greater international cooperation and global solidarity (Singer, Harari, Zizek). Or 
start to reinstate and broaden solidarity-based development strategies (Rodrick), 
with a policy open to the mobility of human beings. This would be a civilised way 
out of the pandemic (Nair). The challenges we face can only be solved by 
multilateral solutions (Pascal Boniface), as shown by the fact that "all attempts at 
strictly national crisis management have failed". New and better governance 
cannot be reconciled with nationalism, "an empty ideology that has nothing to 
offer", notes Bertrand Badie. Nor can it be reconciled with "ridiculous little flags 
that serve no purpose, such as the United Nations, stripped of all authority", adds 
Massimo Cacciari. Global governance is a strong desire, but it is only a means to 
achieve what is important: tackling the planet's problems. It is therefore a good 
tool for dealing synergistically with micro-utopias. It is a medium-range utopia, a 
non-finalist utopia.  
There are three proposals to improve the governance of the planet: a world 
republic, a planetary constitutionalism and an organisation under the SVP banner. 
Cacciari affirms that imagining a world republic has a utopian element, but 
nothing would prevent countries from making agreements and pacts among 
themselves in many areas, as they already do in the economic and financial 
spheres. He is in favour of the UN being "the place where countries deal with 
common rules that are then introduced into individual systems, a political venue 
where these problems are discussed". Luigi Ferrajoli presents "planetary 
constitutionalism": an initiative to be launched in February 2020, which envisages 
an international public sphere to address global challenges and, in particular, 
supranational functions and institutions to guarantee human rights and peace. He 
believes that the EU could promote the transformation of the current World 
Health Organisation into an effective global institution and the creation of other 
global institutions to guarantee social rights, peace or a planetary commons. 
"These seem like utopian hypotheses," Ferrajoli points out, "but they are the only 




rational and realistic answers to the great challenges on which the future of 
humanity depends. Mireille Delmas-Marty believes that the time has come for 
national sovereignty to turn to solidarity and subject globalisation to the rules of 
law. She argues that "universalism is too ambitious" and "sovereignism, which is 
too faint-hearted, is too reclusive". However, "only the world community will be 
able to define common objectives and the resulting responsibilities for global 
actors: states, international organisations and multinational companies" and 
national communities are needed "to hold the various actors, starting with health 
services, accountable". A better world requires coordination between the world 
community and national communities, operating under the principles of legal 
humanism and scientific knowledge, citizen will and public and private powers 
(SVP).  
Improving democracy is another recurrent desire that is deployed in a wide 
variety of ways. There are highly developed (Pettifor), implicit (Rodrick) and 
specific (Delmas-Marty, Valcárcel) arguments in favour of democracy. There are 
calls for generalised democratisation (Sousa and Lessenich), for democracy within 
a broader project (Vázquez), for democracies in specific areas such as labour 
(Lafuente) or technology (Sennet, Zuckerman) and as a vaccine against populisms 
(Harari, Lipovetsky, della Porta). The desire for democratisation is related to the 
imposition of economic logic and the role of states. Beyond the need to 
continually deepen democracy as an unfinished process, the interest in democracy 
stems from its deterioration.  
The most holistic democratisation project is that of Sousa. This is no 
coincidence. It should be remembered that the axis of his political theory is 
radical, emancipatory and intercultural democracy and that he is the author of the 
concepts of high and low intensity democracy. Sousa's merit always lies in his 
clear and direct discourse. "Democracy must be radicalised. The revolution has to 
be a total radicalisation of democracy", he says. Sousa has the ability to create 
metaphors that facilitate the visualisation of the problem and its solution. "The 
democracy that exists today is a democratic island in an archipelago of 
despotisms: despotisms in the family, in the factory, in the public space with 
racism, in the home with violence against women...". Or "There is no way to 





democratise only the political space, you have to democratise society itself. That 
is why it is a total and revolutionary radicalisation, which is in favour of the 
affirmation of life and the dignity of the people".  
Lessenich's democratisation project is also very ambitious. His motto is 
"democratising democracy". In the language of collective action frameworks, 
narrative fidelity is what binds together the stories and myths of inherited cultural 
heritage, which facilitates the understanding of beliefs and actions. If democracy 
is a myth that is part of our cultural heritage, the expression "democratising 
democracy" has the narrative fidelity that facilitates the understanding of this 
author's proposal. Nor is Lessenich's ambition accidental. Lessenich is the author 
of a theory that poses a dilemma between democracy and the environment. The 
dilemma is to increase inclusion, participation and social rights without abusing 
natural resources and fossil fuels. We are used to consuming according to a 
predatory model. The first step to end this model is to achieve a consensus among 
the industrial capitalist countries of the West to change the production model. The 
second step is the creation of "truly democratic spaces" in which people could 
exchange their thoughts "and what the alternatives that would shape the new 
system might look like".  Lessenich proposes a deep and participatory democracy. 
A democracy oriented towards the creation of an open social debate on how to 
reinvent society. And not a democracy in which citizens are limited to choosing 
between existing options. The democratic deepening Lessenich proposes concerns 
both formal and substantive issues in that it explains what should be included in a 
better democracy. He explicitly speaks of "democratising the economy". We have 
long known that after civil citizenship, political citizenship and social citizenship, 
the next objective is economic citizenship. The financialisation of society puts the 
issue of economic democracy back on top of the political and social debate. 
Lessenich is the leading academic voice of economic democracy in the media 
during the pandemic. For this sociologist, democratising the economy is about 
people deciding what we want to be produced and what we do not.  
Pettifor is adamant that we have lost democratic control over the system as 
evidenced by globalisation. According to Pettifor: "The world's monetary systems 
serve the interests of that class of people who earn financial profits or rents by 




lending, speculating and gambling effortlessly. Governments do not control big 
corporations and big capital. A better world requires the existence of a democratic 
public authority capable of putting the economic system at the service of society 
and the ecosystem. Pettifor's message contains some particularly interesting 
features for promoting the creation of collective action frameworks and 
imaginaries. First, it does not simply say that the world needs to be democratised, 
but argues for it. Second, it uses a very visual metaphor: "finance must be made 
the servant and not the master of national and regional economies". And thirdly, it 
presents an us and a them (the 1%) that is already familiar from the Occupy Wall 
Street mobilisations.  
Part of economic democracy is the democratisation of business and labour. 
Thus, the reasons for bringing the old idea of democracy in business and labour 
back into the public debate are the same as those for economic democracy: the 
power of capital versus the power of citizens in general and workers in particular. 
Sara Lafuente calls for the democratisation of business and work in order to 
achieve a fairer society. The way to do this is to recognise workers as having a 
legitimate weight similar to that of shareholders. In a globalised society, explains 
this sociologist, democracy at work has a transnational dimension. For Vázquez, 
the democratisation of business and work is part of participatory ecosocialism.   
Rodrick agrees with Pettifor on the weakness of governments caused by 
globalisation. According to him, "the biggest problem is the lack of autonomy that 
countries have to be able to apply policies aimed at maintaining the social contract 
and aiming for growth". For this economist, the objective is for the international 
economy to serve the objectives of each country and for protection policies to be 
applied whenever necessary. Rodrick's argument contains the idea of democracy, 
but not the word. Other authors, however, mention the word, but do not develop 
the argument. Thus, Delmas-Marty wants democratic governance of the commons 
and Valcárcel, as mentioned above, a transparent, open and democratic state. 
Other messages expressing ideas related to democracy are associated with: 
the power of technology and authoritarian ways out of the crisis. Ethan 
Zuckerman has "hope" that "the digital world will work the way we want it to 
work, not the way some entrepreneur thinks it should work". Richard Sennet has 





"hope" in the development of more social communication networks that displace 
directed forms of technology. The relationship of Zuckerman's and Sennet's 
messages to democracy is to be glimpsed, but does not appear clearly. Lipovetsky 
fears that, in a context of democratic weakness, issues such as migratory pressure 
will not be adequately managed and will encourage authoritarian solutions. Harari 
believes that citizens have to control the political decision-makers who take the 
decisions that shape our future, because it is in our hands "whether the crisis is 
approached from an authoritarian or, on the contrary, a democratic perspective". 
Della Porta shares this civic responsibility for democracy. For her, the crisis 
makes "evident the need for public responsibility and civic sense, for rules and 
solidarity". As an expert on social movements, she identifies them as the agents 
that can counteract the risks of an authoritarian response to the crisis. 
We qualify the desire for a new global governance as a non-finalist utopia. 
In principle, the defence of democracy could have the same qualification. But to 
do so would be to assume a vision of democracy close to the liberal tradition that 
understands democracy as purely formal, an instrument for electing ruling elites 
and perhaps an instrument in the service of individual well-being and happiness. 
The approaches to deepening democracy described above are related to the 
republican tradition that understands democracy as something to be filled with 
content, a fundamental element for human beings to realise their full potential 
(Cortina, 2001, pp. 23-24).  
Finally, a better world needs a better human being: freer, more developed, 
more affective, but, above all, more supportive. Human beings must regain their 
freedom, Byun-Chul Han argues. Enhance the faculties of every being of reason 
through education (Gómez Pin). Reconsider their behaviour (Latour). Establish 
friendlier relations with our fellow human beings (Berardi). Reinventing 
affectivity and pleasure (Berardi). Value mutual support (Cortina). Rethink the 
chains we want to rebuild and the chains we want to break (Latour). Invent new 
solidarity behaviours (Della Porta). Develop intergenerational solidarity (Rosa) 
and intercultural solidarity (Carballal).  
  
 






After the analysis and the thematic classification of the reflections reflected 
in the press, we note that the great traditional utopias do not resonate among 
academics, just as they do not find their way into general society. However, it is 
possible to observe some social scientists and humanists, such as Lissenich or 
Sousa, who have holistic visions of the problems and solutions leading to a better 
world. Most of them develop mid-range utopias. Betting on these could be a 
strategy that intervenes by subtracting difficulty (not to say today impossibility), 
between the formulation of great utopias and the value of proposing great 
changes. But the problem is not the scope of these transformative proposals. 
Rather, it is that many of them appear decontextualised, undescribed, or in 
isolation. All of which makes it difficult for them to be reflected in the social 
imaginary. 
Some proposals are developed chorally, which could be considered the joint 
construction of a narrative. It is a group narrative tending towards a desire for 
transformation in the face of global challenges. This can be seen in the allusions 
to the Green New Deal, a very concrete concept embedded not only in the 
academic but also in the political sphere.   
On the other hand, there are common themes, but no common development. 
The narrative diversifies into themes of idealisation. But within a particular 
theme, there are many different visions. This is what happens with the 
development of democracy or alternative economies. 
This diversification effect does not occur because these themes are trending 
among social concerns, or because they are the most applauded options. It is 
because of the cautious attitude of academics, as demonstrated in the previous 
work, towards the dissemination of their ideas, which invalidates the possibility of 
following a fashion. Experts disappear from the public arena, only for fear of 
scorn (resulting from incomplete versions of their arguments), for fear of being 
considered by the community as visionaries, a fairground attraction, instead of 
thinkers with knowledge-based prognoses.   





Alongside the diversification noted above, there is: the partial development 
of their theories to the media, and the limited resonance of these authors' 
approaches in the community. All this indicates that there is a discontinuity, a 
fragmentation of the narrative. This is so, because the themes dealt with might be 
common to them, but they do not form a common unit of development.  
On the other hand, joint communiqués are scarce. They do not focus on 
change or utopia, and are disseminated on specific occasions. This also confirms 
fragmentation. 
Among the issues addressed, it can be noted that the pandemic as an 
exceptional crisis situation reflects the concerns of academics on the need for the 
state. Most of the authors' criticisms refer to state management. For example, 
reorganisation, coordination. Similarly, it is only the economic aspect that garners 
the greatest number of suggestions. For example, for the first time during the 
pandemic period, the clear need to "revolutionise the economy" is expressed, and 
this is actually the expression of the need for a change in the system itself. In this 
particularity, there is perhaps a common meaning, a common denominator. This is 
so, because it is not only put forward by certain academics specialised in the 
subject (economists). 
Apart from this, the suggestions found in the press and media oscillate 
between survival (of humanity) or improvement; but questions of change and 
consequently utopia are not clearly expressed. In this sense, academics do not dare 
to talk about utopia. Few risk suggesting changes at the global or planetary level 
that require collective action. A situation as exceptional as the pandemic has 
failed to rehabilitate utopia, and proposals for change are fragmented in academia. 
The proof is that those who speak clearly of utopia in times of pandemic are those 
authors who have previously worked on it. 
Narratives are not a whole. It is true that they could never be a whole in the 
strict sense of the word, as they belonged to different personalities. But it is 
proven that at a given moment in the development of individual theoretical 
productions (sociological, philosophical, moral-ethical), a narrative stands out like 
the main tone or rhythm of a song. It happened with Bauman or Byung. Their 
productions transcended among others. The collectivity of academics does not 




present itself in a narrative, but in a set of narratives, i.e. it presents itself in 
fragmented meta-narratives. Moreover, the current crisis has shown a 
transformation and a new rhythm in the paradigm (perhaps more functional, for 
humanity): there has been a shift from formulating ideas in the press and media 
about risk and uncertainty, self-mutilation (or self-exploitation), to others based 
on disbelief.  
The construction of utopias with a finalist scope contributes in principle to 
the configuration of a non-fragmented narrative, but as we have seen, 
dissemination has occurred, as it is in principle a tool to face immediate 
challenges. If narratives are fragmented, utopias show themselves in micro-
utopias. This is also seen in the development of narrative fragments isolated from 
each other. These fragments fall short of constituting an idea of actuality and the 
design of an ideal way forward. This fragmentation confirms the durability of 
postmodernity in which meta-narratives are replaced by micro-narratives, where 
utopias are replaced by micro-utopias and communities are broken down into 
micro-communities.  
In this examination of the specific characteristics of utopian fragmentation 
among academics and its social impact, there are limitations. A future analysis 
could focus on the influence of hyperspecialisation and the criteria of scientific 
and academic evaluation (sponsored in the name of excellence in the constriction 
of imagined worlds). Analysing the formulation of suggestions or proposals in 
separate narratives could work on the non-existence of communities of dissent in 
the social sciences and humanities and the consequences of this for transformative 
social action. 
Intellectuals (as Sousa, 2020) may have to accompany people's aspirations 
even more and work not only in the university environment, but also in 
communities. Academics have important pedagogical work to do and the media is 
an important avenue for this, as has been shown. This work needs to be directed at 
the general public in their role as political actors, in order to introduce new ideas 
into the debates. The future depends on what the political actors (the community) 
are able to think and interpret as achievable. As Wierviorka (2020) says, perhaps 
with the support of intellectuals able to work on knowledge. But it would be 





necessary for this knowledge to be produced in a community of authors, or to be 
shown among all, a predominant voice in that community of authors.   
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